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Inducement and sympathy
——Re-examination of the phenomenon of obscure nature*
Author: Cai Xiangyuan (Authorized by ShanBao Haimei Advanced Research Institute of Confucianism)
Source: Author Author Authorization Confucian Network Published
“Philosophy Trends” 2020 Issue 4
Time: Confucius was in the 2570s, Gengzi, early April day, Yihai
� Mencius’s obsession was often regarded as sympathy in contemporary academic circles, so it was developed from the Scheer area and examined Mencius’ texts from the beginning. In terms of analysis and confession, the essence of obsession is love, not sympathy. As the true love, it has the characteristics of both origin and value structure in Confucian tradition. Its occurrence structure and method of existence can be called induction. Many students in the academic world have noticed Mencius’s obscure differences and sympathy. Huang Yusong used root feelings to engrave the obscure nature, but he misunderstood Scheer, lacked responses to Scheer’s problems, and did not give explicit displays of the roots of feelings. Relying on Husser’s phenomenon analysis, Geng Ning proposed a more original state-of-the-art sympathy than experiencing sympathy. Situation-type sympathy can form the germination of virtue and be based on the essence of the obscure phenomenon. But he failed to follow up on how this kind of situational sympathy could be achieved. Chen Lixing believes that all kinds of sympathy in contemporary Eastern times, including Geng Ning, cannot contain the connotation of the Chinese traditional world. He used Zhu Xi’s confession that the obsession mind had a solid position than the other three minds. Behind it was related to the cosmic theory of “all things are one body” and the ideological structure of existence. On this basis, Heidegger’s “emotional tutor” was used to engrave this lifelong experience revealed by the obsession. The sensory perspective is a step further inquiry on this basis of the “emotional adjustment” of the same kind of heaven and man.
Keywords: Syrol, love, obsession, inspiration
Scherer has advanced emotional ethics to a new level by dividing sympathy and love. The emotional theory is also a major perspective for contemporary Confucian scholars to emphasize the Confucian tradition. Li Zehou and Meng Peiyuan both proposed Confucianism that can be called the emotional body. When they understood the foundation of benevolence from the perspective of emotional perspective, they did not notice the division between sympathy and love (benevolence). They generally regarded sympathy as the foundation of benevolence, hoping to use this to build contemporary values of Confucianism. Li Zehou pointed out the preliminarily experienced Mencius’s ethical thinkingAfter asking for a generalized personality, this kind of experience of generalized nature is established in people’s feelings, and “hidden heart” is sympathy. [1] As Chen Lai criticized, Li Zehou’s relationship is an experiential and ideological relationship. [2] With a deep disagreement with Li Ze, Meng Peiyuan paid more attention to the transcendence in relationships. In order to prevent the formation of ethical and moral emotions through experience and emotional relationships, he clearly divided moral feelings and mental feelings, and the most basic thing for benevolence is the former. Mind and emotional refers to the experience of emotions. Although moral emotions are developed by mental and emotional, they also have a “transcendence” for them, that is, transcend the humanity and private nature of experiencing emotions, and thus become a “reason” with broad meaning. [3] However, when he found how moral feelings could be beyond his thoughts, he complained about his compassion to others. [4]
If the Confucian thought of benevolence is based on sympathy, then from the perspective of Scheer, this kind of benevolence is not pure, and even worsens the relationship between love and sympathy. In fact, Scheller also criticized this benevolence based on the same feelings, believing that this is not a true love. The “modern benevolence” or (the “human love”) based on the same feelings is compared with the real love, and has a complete distinction of value base. “human love” has a kind of uniform thinking and aspiration, which seeks to break the limitations of the ethnic circle, regional circle and even civilization circle, and realize the equal love of the whole human race. The “human benevolence” that forms the origin of modern human nature thinking is towards humans The inner welfare of the people, not the “personality” that is towards people. Differences between them, Christian love is the true love of personality. [5]
Therefore, we need to use the perspective of Scheer to distinguish whether Confucian benevolence comes from sympathy or love. This discussion will help us step by step to distinguish Confucian benevolence and Christian personality loveInclusivenessOnly related.
1. Scheller’s emotional phenomenon is proposed through criticism and dialogue tradition of emotional ethics. The emotional ethics treats sympathy as everything The origin of rational value. Scheller believes that this is problematic because sympathy is self-conscious about value. His reason is that sympathy is a responsive behavior that affects others. Whether sympathy can be valuable and whether sympathy can be valuable due to the sympathy he sympathizes with. Love and hate differences are themselves source behaviors, and they have positive or negative values. [6] Let us first look at his analysis of the phenomenon of sympathy, and then evaluate what unique nature of love and sympathy isQuality structure.
1. In the book “The Intrinsic and Emotional of Compassion”, Scheller pointed out that the word “Sympathie” (Mitgefühl) is ambiguous in Japanese applications and often has divergent references. Therefore, he highlights the essential characteristics of sympathy by analyzing and comparing phenomena related to sympathy.
First, sympathize with someone and disagree with the perception of the person, and also different from the reappearance of it. In all circumstances, before we can develop sympathy (same or same sadness) for other people’s feelings, we need to recognize the other party’s feelings and understand whether the other party is happy or sad. At the same time, it is two different things to confess that understanding other people’s emotional infection and making emotional feelings to other people’s emotional infection. I can understand that you are suffering, but I don’t need to show sympathy for your suffering. We can not only understand the other party’s sensory infection in general, but also gain a realistic guide to other people’s sensory infection through imaginative reappearance, which Scheller calls it a sensation (Nachleben, Nachfühlen) or a scrutiny-induced infection (Nach-leben, Nach-fühlen). Chase – Sensitive infection helps to better elicit sympathy, but it is still an aware behavior, not sympathy. [7]
We can not only understand and reappear the other party’s sensory infection, but also the same sensory infection with the other party in a specific situation. “Mitfühlen” is not an imagination or reappearance of being infected with others, but a unified sensory infection along the way with the other party. The difference between the two seems to imagine listening to the songs in person and listening to the songs in real life. Scheller said that when his parents were facing the pain of their children, both parents felt a sense of sorrow. In this case, parents do not need to reappear or observe the other party’s infection, because they are infected with a unified infection along the way. This kind of “infection together” is still different from sympathy in nature. Because sympathy is a sensory infection, it is formed by the political intention to feel the infection of others. In the case of “infection together”, there is no emotional intention to be infected with others. [8]
We can also be affected by other people’s feelings. For example, people who are happy will become happy along the way, and people who are sad will also be trapped in some unpleasant emotions along the way. This emotional contamination (Gefühlsansteckung) is not the same as the same emotion, and there is no feeling for others here.The “feeling intention” of infection does not participate in the other party’s emotional infection through intentional methods. Because the joyful touch infection caused by other people’s feelings is attributed to itself, it is not the “direction” of touch infection for others. [9]
A unique or extreme feeling that is contaminated with emotion is a sense of unity (Einsfühlung). Here, not only is the “contact infection” of both parties alone because of the infection, but also further steps forward. At this point, the other party’s infectious infection is treated as its own infectious infection, thus gaining a sen
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